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Introduction 
 
 
Political Bickering over the 
International Criminal Court 
The Case of Kenya 
Margit Hellwig-Bötte 
The International Criminal Court’s indictment against Sudanese President Omar 
al-Bashir in 2009 provoked massive criticism from the African Union. The indictment 
of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta swelled those voices to a choir, demanding sus-
pension of his trial and immunity from the ICC for serving heads of state. 
The African Union’s criticism has two roots: Firstly, the wish for its efforts to estab-
lish peace and security in the continent to be taken seriously by the UN Security Coun-
cil and the European Union. Secondly, the desire among the ruling political elites of 
many African states to dissuade the European Union and other Western states from 
focussing their political dialogues with African countries on human rights and rule 
of law, which the former increasingly regard as paternalistic. Although the Assembly 
of States Parties to the ICC, which met in The Hague from 20 to 28 November 2013, 
made concessions to Kenya by amending the rules of procedure, the underlying conflict 
between Africa and Europe over Article 27 of the Rome Statute and the African states’ 
wish to exempt serving heads of state from the jurisdiction of the ICC was not defused. 
The two sides should use the lead-up to the next EU-Africa summit in April 2014 to 
bring their perceptions of international criminal justice closer together again. 
 
When the Rome Statute came into force 
on 1 July 2002 seventeen African countries 
had already joined. Senegal was the first 
country of all to ratify, on 2 February 1999; 
Ghana, Mali, Botswana, Sierra Leone and 
South Africa were also founding members. 
Kenya signed the Statute in 2005 and adopt-
ed it into national law in January 2009 with 
the International Crimes Act. In the mean-
time the number of African signatories 
has swelled to thirty-four, representing the 
largest regional group among the 122 rati-
fying states. At the founding conference in 
Rome in 1998 the African countries joined 
Europe in arguing – against resistance – for 
the chief prosecutor to be granted strong 
powers and for the Court to remain inde-
pendent of the UN Security Council. The 
ICC was given automatic responsibility for 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide. There was no north-south con-
troversy over the canon of values on which 
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the Rome Statute was to build, or the 
establishment of binding international 
criminal justice. In 2000, in its founding 
charter, the African Union also pledged 
to respect democratic principles and con-
demned impunity. 
The Turning-point of 
Sharm el-Sheikh 
This pact between Europe and Africa 
was not to last. At its July 2008 summit 
in Sharm el-Sheikh the African Union 
slammed arrest warrants instigated by 
“non-African states” against African heads 
of state as politically one-sided abuses of 
the universality principle (which permits 
prosecution of crimes that have no con-
nection to the prosecuting country where 
these are illegal under international crimi-
nal law, such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes). The African 
Union urged its member-states not to en-
force the arrest warrants and demanded 
a mutually agreed interpretation of the 
universality principle by the African Union 
and the European Union. Despite the estab-
lishment of a joint working group, the 
latter never materialised. As a consequence 
of these communication failures, the Euro-
pean and African interpretations, including 
those of international criminal justice, 
drifted apart. 
The Kenyan President at the time, Mwai 
Kibaki, for example demonstratively invited 
his Sudanese counterpart Bashir to attend 
the ceremonial inauguration of the Kenyan 
constitution in Nairobi in August 2010, 
an affront to Western diplomats. Kenya re-
fused to hand Bashir over to the ICC in The 
Hague as obliged under the Rome Statute, 
and instead obeyed the AU resolution of 
Sharm el-Sheikh. 
When the ICC’s pre-trial chamber con-
firmed the charges against Uhuru Kenyatta, 
William Ruto and two other defendants in 
January 2012, Kibaki’s government sought 
support from the African Union for having 
the Kenyan trial referred to a Kenyan court 
or suspended on the basis of security con-
cerns under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. 
These efforts left a heavy mark on the elec-
tion campaign, which welded together 
Kenyatta and Ruto and was characterised by 
anti-Western and pan-African rhetoric. Vili-
fying the ICC and attacking the West, above 
all the United Kingdom as the former colo-
nial power, helped Kenyatta to stoke the 
ethnic and national sentiments of his sup-
porters and win the election in the first 
round on 13 March 2013. 
A “Clash of Civilisations?” 
Almost two thirds of all African countries 
have now ratified the Rome Statute. It must 
be noted that the legal understanding of 
ruling political elites in Africa is permeated 
more strongly than in Europe by the idea 
that the head of state is untouchable (even 
as their civil societies struggle to uphold 
the principle of justice). The member-states 
of the African Union and the European 
Union also diverge over the relative impor-
tance of peace and justice as guiding prin-
ciples for stabilising society during or after 
conflict. Whereas criminals in Europe are 
brought to justice by a centralised justice 
system before a society makes a new start 
after violent conflict or civil war, African 
nations place greater importance on restora-
tive justice, redress, compensation and rec-
onciliation, even if this leaves crimes judi-
cially unpunished. 
Fault Lines in the African Union 
In its growing criticism of supposed 
Western paternalism, the African Union 
appears outwardly united but is in fact 
internally divided on the question of how 
to deal with the ICC. South Africa, espe-
cially, finds itself in a dilemma, because 
it has supported the ICC since the outset 
and made rule of law central to its foreign 
policy in the tradition of Nelson Mandela. 
As Chair of the AU Commission it must 
now defend African unity and demonstrate 
solidarity with Kenya’s demand for the trial 
to be suspended. But behind the scenes it is 
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working hard to prevent a collective with-
drawal from the Rome Statute. 
Showdown in the Security Council 
Immediately after the terrorist attack on 
the Westgate Mall in Nairobi on 21 Sep-
tember 2013, the Kenyan government 
demanded that the trial of Kenyatta and 
Ruto be suspended, citing Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute. While Rwanda, Togo and 
Morocco persuaded the UN Security Coun-
cil to discuss the matter on 15 November 
2013, it was already clear that their motion 
for a deferral of up to twelve months would 
fail as the majority did not see world peace 
or regional stability threatened by the 
attack. To that extent the African countries 
deliberately set out to document the Secu-
rity Council’s divisions over dealing with a 
central African concern in order to improve 
Kenya’s negotiating position at the Assem-
bly of States Parties in The Hague. 
Compromise in the 
Assembly of States Parties 
In The Hague Kenya failed to achieve its 
objective of amending the Rome Statute 
to create an arrangement that spared 
Kenyatta – and all other heads of state – 
from participating in trials. But it did at 
least achieve a compromise. The Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence were modified to 
permit the Court to grant exceptions from 
the duty to be present in person on a case-
by-case basis while leaving fundamentally 
intact the accused’s obligation to attend 
trial. In future, for example, participation 
by video conferencing can be permitted at 
the accused’s request. The ICC retains its 
authority in all respects. The Kenyan gov-
ernment sells this arrangement as victory 
over the ICC, but the Rome Statute is not 
affected. 
A Way Forward? 
The fundamental problem of the African 
Union and European Union holding dif-
ferent legal interpretations remains un-
resolved, as does the question of whether 
Kenyatta will attend the opening of his 
trial. While the case was last scheduled for 
5 February 2014, on 19 December 2013 the 
ICC Prosecutor requested an adjournment. 
No new date has yet been announced. Both 
accused have so far outwardly cooperated 
with the ICC. With William Ruto a serving 
vice-president is for the first time ever vol-
untarily in the dock at The Hague. 
Nonetheless, the criticisms expressed 
at Sharm el-Sheikh still persist. Relations 
between Kenya and the European Union 
are likely to remain tense, with Kenya con-
tinuing to accuse the European Union of 
neo-colonial behaviour. Nairobi is particu-
larly aggravated by the European Union’s 
policy of limiting contacts, which largely 
avoids any encounter with the accused 
president and vice-president but at the 
same time continues existing cooperation 
as long as the Kenyan government cooper-
ates with the ICC. 
Although the decision of the Assembly 
of States Parties has relaxed the situation 
in the short term, supporters and critics of 
the ICC should nonetheless use the window 
before the opening of Kenyatta’s trial and 
the next EU-Africa summit in April 2014 
to continue to discuss African criticisms 
of the UN system and the ICC’s procedures 
in formal and informal working groups in 
New York and The Hague. The Rome Statute 
and its universality should be defended. 
The West should offer an honest dialogue 
along the line indicated by the Assembly of 
States Parties – rejecting impunity for Afri-
can heads of state but discussing different 
attitudes to justice, for example in the rela-
tionship between peace and prosecution in 
post-conflict reconstruction. But the dia-
logue must be conducted by both sides in 
the proper venues: only the ICC can decide 
procedural questions, while political dis-
cussions and decisions concerning the 
Rome Statute belong in the Assembly of 
States Parties. 
Europe should leave no doubt that it 
takes human rights and their universality 
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seriously. But African governments also 
have a duty to reveal how they intend to 
ensure that the rights of victims and minor-
ities receive protection equal to those of the 
ruling elites, above all those of their heads 
of state. The principles of international 
criminal justice and the independence of 
the ICC must not be compromised: all par-
ties to the Rome Statute owe that to the 
victims of violence and armed conflict, not 
least in Kenya. 
The argument that all persons currently 
accused before the ICC come from African 
countries should not simply be dismissed 
out of hand. Of course the so-called ICC 
situation countries should be viewed in an 
overall perspective with former Yugoslavia, 
Lebanon and Cambodia, for which separate 
tribunals were established. But the Security 
Council’s inability to speak with one voice 
on human rights becomes glaringly obvious 
when it fails to refer crimes against human-
ity in countries like Syria to the ICC. The 
resulting loss of credibility of the UN sys-
tem is registered especially acutely in Afri-
can countries, which accuse the Security 
Council of assigning greater weight to 
human rights questions in their countries 
than elsewhere in the world. 
Germany is not only one of the initiators 
of the ICC; its own history also lends it a 
strong commitment to a court that is based 
on the principles of the Nuremberg Tribu-
nals. It enjoys a good reputation in Africa 
as an honest broker that is not pursuing 
the interests of a former colonial power. 
Both grant credibility to the German en-
gagement for human rights and rule of law. 
Germany should use its influence to foster 
dialogue with African states and their civil 
societies on international criminal justice 
and rule of law and resolve the EU/AU bloc 
confrontation. Pursuing an autonomous 
role on this issue can also sharpen its Africa 
profile within the European Union. 
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